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THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION'S AUTHORITY TO ORDER IN
KIND REFUNDS OF NATURAL GAS
To ensure consumersa reliablesupply of naturalgas, the FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission is grantedbroadenforcementpowers under the Natural GasAct.
Where a gasproducerorppelinecompany has illegally abandonedinterstateservice,
the Commission may seek any ''ecessary or appropriate"remedy. Federalcourts
have disagreedabout the scope of Commission authority and the propriety of Commission enforcement techniques. This Note examines a conflict between the Fith
and Tenth Circuits regarding Commission authority to orderin kind paybacks of
naturalgas to remedy illegal abandonments. In assessing the validity of these refunds, the Note analyzesjudicial interpretationsof Commission authority, ident /es
the standards governing Commission discretion,and discusses alternative remedies.
The Note concludes that the rationalessupportingin kind refunds in other contexts
do not apply to abandonments,and that the Commission mayfruitfullypursue alternative remedies without overreachingits authority

INTRODUCTION

REGULATING THE NATURAL GAS industry has always
been a difficult and controversial proposition.' The Natural
Gas Act2 granted broad discretion to the Federal Power Commission (FPC) and its successor, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC),3 to regulate the interstate movement of natural gas. Over the years, federal court interpretations of the Act
have expanded the Commission's authority and jurisdiction to include independent producers of natural gas.4
The Commission's primary responsibility under the Act is to
ensure that natural gas producers charge "just and reasonable"
rates to consumers.' The Commission also enforces contracts to
supply natural gas. When a natural gas producer seeks to contract
for the interstate sale of gas, the producer must apply to the Coin1. See ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD BUsINESS SCHOOL 56-76 (R. Stobaugh & D. Yergin ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY
FUTURE].

2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
3. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission replaced the Federal Power Commission when Congress enacted the Department of Energy Organizations Act, Pub. L. No.
95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977) (codified at scattered sections of 3, 5, 7, 12, 15 & 42 U.S.C.). 42
U.S.C. §§ 7171-72 (Supp. V. 1981). Both agencies are hereinafter referred to as the
Commission.
4. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 685 (1954).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c-717d (1976).
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mission for a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing the sale.6 After the certificate is issued, the producer

must continue to supply the gas to that particular purchaser and
cannot abandon the service without the Commission's express
prior approval.7

Strict enforcement of natural gas supply contracts ensures a
reliable source of gas for consumers.'

When FERC determines

that a producer or pipeline company has illegally abandoned interstate service, it seeks to restore the injured customer to its previ-

olation position and deter future abandonments.9

One

enforcement technique requires the producer to pay back the volume of gas to the customer from whom it was illegally diverted.'
This Note inquires whether FERC possesses authority under
the Act to order paybacks of natural gas to remedy illegal abandonments." Because the Act does not specifically mention this
power, the Commission and the courts have found such authority
in the general grant of power contained in section 16 of the Act. 2
To determine the validity of in kind refunds, this Note analyzes

the different judicial interpretations of section 16,'" the Commission's previous use of both monetary and in kind refunds,' 4 and
situations where section 16 has served to authorize other actions
by the Commission.' 5 This Note asserts that previous interpretations of section 16 authorizing other types of refunds do not sup6. Id. § 717f(c). This subsection provides in pertinent part: "No natural-gas company... shall engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . unless there is in force with respect to such natural-gas
company a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission authorizing such acts or operations... "
7. Id. § 717f(b). This subsection provides:
No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject
to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of such
facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and
obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Commission that the available
supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of service is
unwarranted, or that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit
such abandonment.
8. See infra notes 22-37 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 103-26 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 38-67 & 103-43 and accompanying text.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1976). This section provides in pertinent part: "The Commission shall have power to perform any and all acts, and to prescribe, issue, make, amend,
and rescind such orders, rules, and regulations as it may find necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of this chapter."
13. See infra notes 38-56 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 71-139 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 144-67 and accompanying text.
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port FERC's authority to order in kind paybacks in the
abandonment context. 6 Finally, this Note examines alternative
remedial and deterrent devices available to the Commission, demonstrating that in kind paybacks are neither necessary nor
appropriate.' 7

I.

PREVENTING ABANDONMENTS

The Act grants the Commission authority to regulate only interstate transportation and sales of natural gas, and not transactions wholly within one state.' 8 Thus, intrastate shipments were
beyond the Commission's regulatory authority. Since the Act did

not require intrastate producers to charge "just and reasonable"
rates,' 9 the price of intrastate gas, unlike regulated interstate gas,
increased with demand.20 This potential price differential gave
producers an incentive to switch to intrastate markets. 2' Thus,
producers developed larger intrastate markets during the latter
part of the 1960's.22 The rapid development of these markets
caused greater demand in the producing states, triggering higher
intrastate prices. 23 Now producers could increase their revenues
by diverting gas under interstate contracts to new intrastate markets.24 Since this gas was committed to interstate commerce under
a certificate of public convenience and necessity, and permission
for abandonment was highly unlikely,25 many producers illegally
abandoned their interstate service.26 To guard against shortages
16. See infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976). This subsection provides:
The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in
interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale
for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any
other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale,
but shall not apply to any other transportationor sale of naturalgas or to the local
distribution of naturalgas or to thefacilities usedfor such distribution or to the
production or gathering of naturalgas.
(Emphasis added.)
19. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c-717d (1976).
20. ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 1, at 62.
21. See Comment, NaturalGas Policy Act of 1978. Will It Alleviate the NaturalGas
Shortage?, I1 ST. MARY'S L.J. 140, 141-46 (1979).
22. Marston & Hollis, A Review andAssessment of the FERCNaturalGas Enforcement
Program, 16 Hous. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1979).
23. Id.
24. Id at 1107-08.
25. Note, FederalRegulation of the Dedication and Abandonment of Natural Gas in
Interstate Commerce, 24 Loy. L. REV. 678, 691 (1978).
26. See, e.g., Cox v. FERC, 581 F.2d 449, 450 (5th Cir. 1978).
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in nonproducing states, the Commission strictly enforced all cer-

tificates for interstate gas contracts.

7

Demand for natural gas continued to increase sharply during
the early 1970's, primarily because interstate supplies lagged behind demand. 28 Regulation kept interstate prices artificially low,
leaving producers with no incentive to develop new supplies of
more remote natural gas.29 Instead, the absence of price ceilings

on intrastate gas encouraged producers to develop new production
for intrastate customers. 3° To alleviate the problem of interstate
supply and demand, President Carter proposed the National En-

ergy Plan." Congress endorsed his recommendation by enacting
Energy Act, which included the Natural Gas Policy
the National
2
Act.

3

The NGPA established a complex regulatory structure to effect a gradual deregulation of natural gas. 33 It destroyed most distinctions between interstate and intrastate gas by including both
types in the basic categories of new and high-cost gas. 34 As a re-

sult, intrastate natural gas is subject to the same price ceilings as
new or high-cost interstate gas. Only gas dedicated to interstate

commerce as of November 8, 1978 remains within the Act's jurisdiction. 31 Ostensibly, then, the incentive no longer exists for producers to abandon their interstate gas contracts in favor of
intrastate agreements. But a producer of old certificated gas could
27.
28.
29.
30.

See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC, 563 F.2d 588, 596-97 (3d Cir. 1977).
Comment, supra note 21, at 143-44.
ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 1, at 64.
Id.

31.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ENERGY POLICY AND PLANNING, THE

NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN 2 (1977), reprintedin SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 95TH CONG., IST SEss., THE PRESIDENT'S ENERGY PROGRAM 16 (Comm.
Print 1977). The National Energy Plan sought to reduce the United States' dependence on
foreign oil by instituting conservation and research and development programs. The Plan
required the conversion of industry and utilities from oil and natural gas to coal, and the
development of renewable and inexhaustable energy resources. Comment, supra note 21,
at 146 n.35.
32. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351 (codified at scattered sections of 15 & 42 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter referred to as the NGPA].
33. See Pierce, NaturalGas Regulation, Deregulation,and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REv.
63, 86-99 (1982). Although the NGPA provided separate formulas for price calculation of
more than thirty categories of gas, it created three basic categories of gas: (I) "high-cost
gas," deregulated in November 1979; (2) "new gas," subject to price ceilings which increase
over time in constant dollars, with deregulation scheduled sometime between 1985 and
1988; and (3) "old gas," subject to the same kind of price ceilings as new gas but not
scheduled for deregulation. Id. at 87-89.
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3315(b)(3), 3316(b) (Supp. V 1981).
35. Id. § 3431(a)(1).
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claim a depletion of reserves to receive permission for a legal
abandonment from the Commission. Later, the same producer or
his successor in interest could drill new wells on a nearby tract of
land and tap into the same supply of gas. Since this "discovery"
would have occurred after November 8, 1978, it would be subject
to the price ceilings for new gas-which exceed the price allowed
under the old certificate. Thus, an incentive still exists for producers to circumvent the regulatory scheme and sell their gas at a
higher price. This scenario is analogous to the abandonment of
interstate production in favor of an intrastate contract; as before, a
remedy is needed to compensate customers and deter future
violations.
Since the Act "does not apply to natural gas which was not
committed or dedicated to interstate commerce as of November 8,
1978, ' ' 36 contracts certificated after that date cannot be enforced
through section 16 refunds. Though most new natural gas production lies beyond the jurisdiction of the Act, the success of deregulation under the NGPA depends on the enforcement of old
gas contracts.37 To deter future abandonments, the Commission
must continue to enforce the certificates of public convenience
and necessity by actively pursuing violations of the Act.
II.

CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION

16

The language of section 16 appears to grant broad authority to
the Commission,3" yet no consensus exists on the proper interpretation of this section. The legislative history of the Act contains
little reference to section 16 and offers no guidance on its correct
interpretation. 39 As a result, federal courts have failed to provide
a consistent reading of section 16.
A.

BroadJudicialInterpretation

Section 16 of the Act and section 309 of the Federal Power
36. Id.
37. The NGPA was a compromise between continued, complete regulation of prices
under the Act and total price deregulation. Congress adopted the middle ground to prevent the skyrocketing natural gas prices that might result from total deregulation. Comment, supra note 21, at 157. Under the adopted plan, the lower prices of old gas offset the
higher prices of new and high-cost gas so that the overall market price is lower than it
would be under complete price deregulation. See id. at 146-48. To prevent large increases
in the overall market price of natural gas, the Commission must ensure that old gas remains at the certificated price.
38. See supra note 12.
39. See, e.g., H.R. REP.No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
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Act 4° contain identical language and are often interpreted similarly by federal courts. 41 The D.C. Circuit provided a broad interpretation of section 309 in Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v.
FPC,42 which many courts have cited when interpreting section
1643 The court stated:
While such "necessary or appropriate" provisions do not have
the same majesty and breadth in statutes as in a constitution,
there is no dearth of decisions making clear that they are not
restricted to procedural minutiae, and that they authorize an
agency to use means of regulation not spelled out in detail, provided the agency's action conforms with the purposes and policies of Congress and does not contravene any terms of the
Act.44
The Third Circuit gave a similar reading to section 16 in Guf
4 5 In Gui Oil, the court viewed section 16 "as a
Oil Corp. v. FPC.
grant of remedial power to the Commission which, in keeping
with the Commission's duty to serve the public interest, [cannot]
be limited to the express remedies provided by other sections of
the Act."'46
40. 16 U.S.C. § 825h (1976).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 54-55.
42. 379 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Niagara Mohawk operated four hydroelectric
projects which the FPC had licensed in 1963 and 1964. The license orders specified effective dates of 1941 and 1949. Section 10(d) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 803(d)
(1976), requires the operator of a hydroelectric project to establish amortization reserves
from excess profits earned after 20 years of project operation. Id. Years of operation are
measured from the effective date of the license. Niagara Mohawk claimed that the Commission lacked authority to set an effective date predating the issuance date of the license.
379 F.2d at 154-56. The court held that the Commission had authority to set retroactive
effective dates, and supported its holding by referring to the broad grant of authority in
§ 309 of the Federal Power Act. Id. at 158-59.
43. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1973); New
England Power Co. v. FPC, 467 F.2d 425, 430 (D.C. Cir. 1972), af'd, 415 U.S. 345 (1974);
Mesa Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 441 F.2d 182, 187 (5th Cir. 1971).
44. 379 F.2d at 158.
45. 563 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977). For a discussion of the facts of this case, see infra
notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
46. Id. at 606 (following Mesa Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 441 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1971)).
In Mesa, the petitioner (successor in interest to Hugoton Production Company) sought
review of an FPC order denying Hugoton's request for abandonment of a contract to sell
natural gas to Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company. The Commission had also ordered
Hugoton to refund amounts collected in excess of a reasonable "in-line" price of 13 cents
per Mcf during the entire contract period. Id. at 182-85. (Mcf is the abbreviation 'for
million cubic feet, a standard unit of measurement for natural gas volumes.) The Fifth
Circuit held that the Commission possessed authority to order the refund of the price differential. Id. at 186. The court addressed the authority issue by referring to § 16 of the Act
and "its counterpart, § 309 of the Federal Power Act." Id. at 187. The court stated that
"[b]oth provisions have received broad interpretations to enable the Commission to effectively regulate the gas and power industries," and referred to the D.C. Circuit's interpreta-
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These interpretations do not restrict the power granted in section 16 either to the framing of procedural details for Commission
orders and regulations or to the powers expressly provided in
other sections of the Act. The courts do require the exercise of

authority to conform to both the purposes and express provisions
of the Act. 47 Finally, the authority provided by section 16 is narrower than that provided by the necessary and proper clause of
the United States Constitution.4 8
At first glance, these broad interpretations of section 16 seem
reasonable in light of the large and complex industry the Commission is entrusted to regulate. Upon closer inspection, however, the
scope of power conferred by these opinions appears too broad to
apply in all situations. While the Commission must be afforded
sufficient authority to perform its duties, the scope of section 16
should be defined with a view toward protecting the market mechanisms of the industry-which means that the concerns of both
consumers and producers must be weighed.49
B.

Narrow JudicialInterpretation

There is no shortage of court opinions endorsing narrower interpretations of section 16. The D.C. Circuit has vacillated between broad and narrow interpretations, demonstrating that even
one circuit cannot agree on a single meaning.5" The court applied
tions of these sections in NiagaraMohawk. Id. at 187-88. For a discussion of the Niagara
Mohawk interpretation, see supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
47. See NiagaraMohawk, 379 F.2d at 158; Mesa, 441 F.2d at 187; Guf Oil, 563 F.2d
at 606.
48. The Supreme Court articulated the preeminent interpretation of the necessary and
proper clause of Article I, § 8 in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819):
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 421.
49. See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. The D.C. Circuit has gone to great
lengths to reconcile its more recent, narrow interpretations with precedent. In Mobil Oil
Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court cited with approval its Niagara
Mohawk interpretation, though stating that "[a] more tempered and balanced approach
[than the one proposed by the Commission in the instant case] would accord reasonable
significance to section 16, without making it a carte blanche." 483 F.2d at 1255. Thus, the
court employed an interpretation normally identified with expansive readings of § 16, see,
e.g., Mesa, 441 F.2d at 187, to support a narrow reading of the section.
The Third Circuit took a more honest approach to reconciling the two interpretations of
§ 16 in Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC, 563 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977). The court examined the differences between the two approaches of Mesa and Mobil, and asserted that the broad interpretation in Mesa was more persuasive. Id. at 606-07.

19831

IN KIND NATUR4L GAS REFUNDS

a narrow reading in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC,5 ' declaring that section 16 "cannot enlarge the choice of permissible procedures beyond those that may fairly be implied from the substantive
sections and the functions there defined."5 2 Quoting an earlier
D.C. Circuit case, the Mobil court concluded that "'Congress did
not give the FPC carte blanche to take whatever action it might
consider appropriate in furtherance of' the objectives of the
53
Act."
Section 16 and section 309 were also accorded a narrow scope
in New England Power Co. v. FPC.5 4 "Both sections," declared
the court, "are of an implementary rather than substantive character. . . . These sections merely augment existing powers conferred upon the agency by Congress, they do not confer
independent authority to act."5 5
According to this line of cases, the scope of section 16 authority is grounded in the express provisions of the Act. Any order or
regulation must derive its authority from another section of the
Act. Thus, the limits of Commission power are more clearly defined under narrow interpretations of section 16. Ultimately,
though, both the narrow and broad interpretations of the provision agree that section 16 does not confer absolute discretion upon
the Commission. 6
51. 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973). For a discussion of the Mobil facts, see infra notes
157-63 and accompanying text.
52. 483 F.2d at 1257.
53. Id. at 1248 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 463 F.2d 256, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
The earlier Mobil case did not involve the scope of the Commission's authority under § 16,
but rather the scope of its jurisdiction. The court held that royalty provisions in oil and gas
leases did not constitute sales of natural gas for resale in interstate commerce subject to the
Act, and thus lessor landowners were not subject to regulation as natural gas companies.
463 F.2d at 259. The court noted that the congressional purpose behind the language of the
Act--to protect consumers-was not sufficient reason for expanding the Commission's jurisdiction to include the petitioners. Id. at 263.
54. 467 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aft'd, 415 U.S. 345 (1974). In this case, representatives of the natural gas pipeline and electric industries claimed that the FPC lacked authority to issue an order revising fee schedules for filing applications under the Natural Gas
and Federal Power Acts, or to assess the costs of administering these programs against
companies within its jurisdiction. 467 F.2d at 426. The Commission asserted that § 309
and § 16 authorized its order. Id. at 430.
55. Id. at 430-31.
56. See,eg., GulfOil, 563 F.2d at 606 (broad interpretation) (FPC actions must conform to both the purposes and express provisions of the Act); Mobil, 483 F.2d at 1248
(narrow interpretation) (Congress did not give the FPC "carteblanche").
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C. Suggested Interpretationof Section 16
Neither the legislative history nor the decisions of the various
courts of appeals provide a definitive interpretation of section 16.
As a result, common methods of statutory interpretation must be
employed to derive the correct meaning of the statute.
Inspection of statutory purpose is often employed to determine
the scope of statutory authority." According to its legislative history, the basic purpose of the Act was "to occupy this field in
which the Supreme Court has held that the states may not act."5 8
This terse statement of purpose was expanded by numerous federal court opinions. The Supreme Court found that the "overriding congressional purpose was to plug the 'gap' in regulation of
natural-gas companies"5 9 and "to afford consumers a complete,
permanent and effective bond of protection from excessive rates
and charges."6 0 By the early 1970's, most federal courts had come
to agree that "[t]he Commission's primary purpose under the Natural Gas Act is to protect the consumer."'"
While judicial assessments of statutory purpose must be kept
in mind when analyzing the language of section 16, the interests of
producers and intermediate parties cannot be ignored. The natural gas shortage of the early 1970's demonstrates the necessity of
balancing consumer and producer interests. During this period,
the Commission concentrated on protecting consumers by ensuring that producers charged just and reasonable rates. But the FPC
ignored the fact that the small return on investment deterred producers from developing new reserves. As a direct result, demand
at the prevailing price level greatly exceeded the stagnant supply
and a severe shortage ensued. 62 Thus, the Fifth Circuit has
stressed that the Commission must "strive to reach a balance between the consumer, producer, and those whose interests fall in
57. The Supreme Court "has repeatedly held that the width of administrative authority must be measured in part by the purposes for which it was conferred." Permian Basin
Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 776 (1968); see American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States,
344 U.S. 298,311 (1953); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943); Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 193-94 (1941); Piedmont & Northern Ry. v. ICC, 286 U.S.
299, 311-12 (1932).
58. H.R. REP. No. 709, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. 2 (1937).
59. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 682 (1954).
60. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959).
61. See, e.g., Mesa, 441 F.2d at 186 (5th Cir. 1971); California Gas Producers Ass'n v.
FPC, 421 F.2d 422, 428 (9th Cir. 1970); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 389 F.2d 272
(6th Cir. 1968).
62. Pierce, supra note 33, at 67-68.
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between."63
Section 16 authorizes the Commission to perform all "necessary or appropriate" acts.' These two words have very different
meanings: necessary means essential or indispensible, 61 while appropriate connotes fit, proper, or suitable.6 6 By using the disjunctive "or" instead of the conjunctive "and," Congress validated any
exercise of authority which satisfies either definition.
The federal courts, however, have misapplied the "necessary
or appropriate" test. The opinions concentrate on "necessary"
and neglect to inquire whether a Commission action is "appropriate" before invalidating it.6 7 To be faithful to the plain statutory
language, the Commission and the courts must employ a necessary or appropriate test before deciding that an exercise of authority is invalid under section 16.
While little guidance can be derived from either the legislative
history of the Act or federal court decisions construing it, several
basic conclusions can be reached. First, both the narrow and
broad interpretations of the statute agree that section 16 does not
confer absolute discretion upon the Commission. 68 Second, both

precedent and industry experience mandate that Commission actions be analyzed in light of their impact on consumers and producers.69 Finally, the validity of Commission enforcement
techniques-including in kind refunds--must be determined
through faithful adherence to a necessary or appropriate
standard.7 °
III.

PREVIOUS

USE OF REFUNDS

The Commission employs cash and in kind refunds to remedy
and deter several different types of violations. Cash refunds have
been ordered in excessive rate and illegal abandonment cases,
while in kind refunds have been used to remedy illegal curtailments and abandonments. Although federal courts have upheld
63. Mesa, 441 F.2d at 186.
64. See supra note 12.
65. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1511 (P. Gove ed. 1970).
66. Id. at 106.
67. See, e.g., Mobil, 483 F.2d at 1255 (FPC has no authority to act in "whatever manner it deems necessary or expeditious"). But see Gulf Oil, 563 F.2d at 605 ("In order to
affirm the order, we need find only that it is appropriate ....
.
68. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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cash refunds in both contexts and in kind paybacks in curtailment
cases, the validity of in kind refunds in the abandonment context
does not necessarily follow.
A.

Cash Refunds

Over the years, the Commission has employed monetary refunds in a variety of contexts. The courts have upheld refunds for
excessive rates as well as for illegal abandonments.7"
1. Refundsfor Excessive Rates
In United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, Inc. ,72
the Commission had imposed new conditions on existing certificates of public convenience and necessity. Producers were required to provide gas at 18.5 cents per Mcf initially, and to refund
amounts collected under the old certificate in excess of the newly
established price.73 Upholding the refund, the Supreme Court
stated:
While the Commission "has no power to make reparation orders," its power to fix rates under section 5 of the Act being
prospective only, it is not so restricted where its order, which
never became final, has been overturned by a reviewing court.
Here, the original certificate orders were subject to judicial review; and judicial review at times results in the return of benefits received under the upset administrative order. An agency,
like a court, can undo what is wrongfully done by virtue of its
order.74
Three years later, the Supreme Court decided FPC v. Sunray
DX Oil Co. , a case similar to Callery. In Sunray, the Commission determined an appropriate price for service under permanent
71. See infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
72. 382 U.S. 223 (1965). In Callery, the FPC issued certificates of public convenience
and necessity to several gas producers who entered into sales contracts calling for initial
prices of 21.4 to 23.8 cents per Mcf. Consumer interests challenged the orders in court after
deliveries commenced. Pending the outcome of an area rate proceeding, the Commission
advised the producers that they might be required to refund amounts found to be inconsistent with the public interest. Id. at 225-26.
73. Id. at 226. The order also provided that until the Commission determined 'just
and reasonable" rates for southern Louisiana, or until July 1, 1967, whichever occurred
first, the producers could not increase their rates above 23.55 cents. Id.
74. Id. at 229 (quoting FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 618 (1944)).
75. 391 U.S. 9 (1968). In this rate case, the FPC issued temporary certificates of public
convenience and necessity under § 7(c) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1976), authorizing
producers to sell gas at or below the guideline price of 18 cents per Mcf. Some of the
certificates contained an express condition that refunds could be ordered if the eventual inline price was set at a lower level. The other certificates simply contained general cautionary language that the certificates should not be treated as final. Id. at 40-41.
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certificates which was lower than that currently in force under
temporary certificates. Giving the permanent price retroactive effect, the Commission ordered the producers to refund to consumers amounts reflecting the difference between the new price and
the one established by the temporary certificate.7 6 The producers
claimed the refund order was improper because the temporary
certificate was "retroactively unmodiflable."" 7 Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court concluded that when the Commission
exercises "its power to condition permanent certificates under
§ 7(e), [it] may require producers to refund amounts collected
under outstanding, unconditioned temporary
certificates in excess
78
of the finally established in-line price."
2. Refundsfor IllegalAbandonments
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC,7 9 the FPC had found that Gulf Oil
Corporation (Gulf) violated the Act by delivering less than the
required contractual amount to Texas Eastern Transmission Company (Texas Eastern).8 0 The Commission ordered Gulf to refund
to Texas Eastern "a sum equal to 'the difference between [Texas
Eastern's] request for gas and Gulfs deliveries [multiplied by] the
difference between the contract price and the otherwise applicable
area or national rate[s]' and interest." 8' The refund order also
contained a recoupment provision whereby Gulf would recover
the entire contract price and lose only the deferred value of its
82
money for the default.
The Gulf Oil approach to illegal abandonments is well reasoned because the cash refund was a necessary remedy under the
circumstances. The inadequacy of the other sanctions available to
the Commission supports the necessity of the order. Imposition of
76. Id. at 40.
77. Id. at 44.
78. Id. at 45.
79. 563 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977).
80. Id. at 593. Gulf delivered gas to Texas Eastern under a contract authorized by a
certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission. Gulf greatly
overestimated the reserves in the field from which it was producing the gas; consequently, it

delivered less than the contract amount to Texas Eastern. Id.
81. Id. at 603 (quoting FPC Opinion No. 780, 56 F.P.C. 2293, 2300 (1976)).
82. 563 F.2d at 603-04. Under the recoupment provision, the total contract amount of
4A trillion cubic feet (Tcf) remained in effect. When Gulf delivered an amount ofgas equal
to the contract quantity less the amount of gas for which it paid refunds, it could charge the
contract price plus the amount of refunds previously paid on an equivalent amount of gas.
Id. at 604.
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a fine or jail term on the producer,8 3 for example, would not have
redressed the injury to Texas Eastern.
3. Differences Between the Use of Refundsfor Illegal
Abandonments and Excessive Rates

Using refunds to remedy excessive prices differs distinctly
from using them to remedy illegal abandonments. To control excessive prices, the Commission has relied not only on its authority

under section 16, but also on its section 7 power 84 to impose con-

ditions on certificates of public convenience and necessity." But
the Commission cannot rely on section 7 to remedy abandonments because
section 7 does not attach refunds to the issuance of
86
a certificate.

The object of the remedy also differs in the two contexts. The
cash refund in Callery was intended to rectify improper price setting by the producer.8 7 In Gf Oil, the Commission ordered a
monetary refund to return the injured customer to the position it
occupied before the illegal abandonment88 and to prevent future
illegal abandonments.8 9 Because of these differences between
remedying excessive rates and remedying abandonments, reference to remedies in excessive rate cases cannot support the validity of in kind refunds in the abandonment context.
B.

In Kind Refunds

The courts disagree as to whether the Commission has authority under section 16 to order in kind refunds of natural gas for
unlawful abandonment of certificated production. While the
Commission has employed in kind refunds to remedy violations
of curtailment plans, such use does not justify in kind refunds for
abandonments. 90
83. See infra text accompanying notes 172-73.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1976). This subsection provides in pertinent part: "The Commission shall have the power to attach to the issuance of the certificate and to the exercise
of the rights granted thereunder such reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience and necessity may require." Id.
85. See Sunray, 391 U.S. at 45.
86. Although refunds relate to a certificate of public convenience and necessity, they
are not part of the certification process required under section 7. See supra note 84.
87. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
88. Guf Oil, 563 F.2d at 603.
89. Id. at 608.
90. See infra notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
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1. Violations of CurtailmentPlans
The critical shortage of natural gas in the early 1970's made it
"necessary to promulgate procedures that would maximize high
priority of usage for [natural gas]." 9 1 In response to this need, the
Commission established natural gas priorities based on end use,9 2
and requested producers who were unable to meet their contract
delivery requirements to submit curtailment plans for Commis93
sion approval.
In Texas Gu , Inc. v. FPC,94 the Fifth Circuit addressed the
validity of in kind refunds in the curtailment context. The United
Gas Pipe Line Company (United) had adopted a curtailment plan
which apportioned its decreased gas supply among its customers,
including Texas Gulf, according to priority of uses.95 United petitioned for an order enforcing the curtailment plan, which the
Commission temporarily granted pending determination of the
plan on its merits.96 Texas Gulf protested the decrease of its supply under the plan, initiated legal proceedings, and began to overtake its curtailed entitlement. 97 The FPC objected to this flagrant
violation and ordered Texas Gulf to "pay back that overtake to
United by United limiting Texas Gulf to 1,500 Mcf per day until
full repayment of the overtake has been made."98
The Fifth Circuit upheld the FPC's order of in kind refunds,
stating: "The Commission was within its sound discretion as implementor and controller of our national fuel supplies in requiring
Texas Gulf to repay its overtakes from its allotment under
United's curtailment program. . . . Permitting a customer to disregard a supplier's curtailment program would completely destroy
compliance with the reduced allotments." 99
In another curtailment case, United States Steel Corp. v.
° the D.C. Circuit espoused a similar view:
FPC,1
91. FPC Order No. 467,49 F.P.C. 85, 85 (1973), refprintedin Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 50 app. (D.C. Cir. 1974).
92. Id. at 86-87, 506 F.2d at 50-51.
93. For a description of the Commission's actions relating to curtailments, see Pacoc
Gas, 506 F.2d at 35-36.
94. 494 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1974).
95. Texas Gulf had contracted with United to supply Texas Gulf with natural gas for
use in its sulphur mine. The Commission issued a certificate of public convenience and
necessity for this interstate sale of gas. Id at 790.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 790-91.

98. Id. at 791.
99. Id. at 792.
100. 533 F.2d 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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Not only does "common sense," as the Fifth Circuit states in
Texas Guf, support a payback but common honesty commands it. . . Carnegie [Natural Gas Company, who violated
the plan,] says this is a "penalty," but to us it is but simple
restitution due those who were rightfully entitled to the use of
the gas. 10 1

The courts of appeals in Texas Gf and United States Steel
properly upheld the validity of in kind refunds for curtailment
plan violations. The payback order satisfied the necessary or appropriate test because of the lack of another adequate remedy or
deterrent. Moreover, the willfulness of the violations warranted a
02
drastic sanction.'

2. Illegal Abandonment of Interstate Service
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits are in direct conflict over the
validity of in kind refunds in the abandonment context. The Fifth
0 3 The producer,
Circuit upheld their validity in Cox v. FERC.1

Cox, formed a natural gas production unit with 80% of its reserves
committed to interstate sales to Texas Gas Transmission Corporation (Texas Gas), which the Commission duly certificated."° For
six years Cox delivered 100% of the gas to Texas Gas, distributing
the profits to owners of both the 80% and 20% shares.' 0 5 When
Cox entered into an intrastate contract for the sale of the 20%
share, Texas Gulf petitioned the Commission for a declaratory
judgment barring the sale until Cox obtained an abandonment
06
from the Commission.

The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Commission that Cox had
101. Id. at 1223-24.
102. See infra notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
103. 581 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1978).
104. Id. at 450. Normally, the producer commits 100% of a field's reserves to one customer or divides 100% of the known reserves among several customers; e.g., 25% to customer.4, 30% to B, and 45% to C. As the producer extracts gas from the well, the volumes
are divided proportionally among the respective purchasers. In Cox, however, the producer committed 80% of the reserves to Texas Gas, but did not commit the remaining 20%
to another customer. Since this 20%was not committed to a gas sales contract, it was not
subject to a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. Texas Gulf alleged it was entitled to 100% of production since it had received
100% of production during the first six years. Cox maintained that because the 20% share
was not committed to interstate commerce, no illegal abandonment occurred when it was
sold in intrastate commerce. Cox argued that it had produced the unit "out of balance";
i.e., the 80% share was withdrawn from the well first, leaving the 20% share in reserve
under ground, or "banked," until it was later committed to commerce under a different
contract. FERC refused to accept this analysis because Cox had engaged for so long in out
of balance production, and had distributed the proceeds from the 80% sale to owners of the
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sold uncertificated gas (the 20% share) in interstate commerce in
violation of the Act. The court and the Commission further
agreed that Cox's subsequent diversion of gas to intrastate commerce constituted an unauthorized abandonment." 7 FERC ordered the appellants to refund the supply of diverted gas to Texas
Gas and its interstate customers;"0 8 in upholding the order, the
Fifth Circuit concluded: "[Tihe payback in kind similarly prevents unjust enrichment and also requires petitioners, who vio-

lated the Act, to bear the burden of post-violation increases in the
price of natural gas. Accordingly, the payback in kind remedy is
equitable, reasonable, and within the authority of FERC."'1 9
In another illegal abandonment case, McCombs v. FERC,1 0°
the Tenth Circuit contradicted the Fifth by denying the Commission the authority to order in kind refunds of natural gas."' In
1953, Bee Quin, owner of the "Butler B" tract of land, contracted

for the sale of gas to United Gas Pipe Line Company (United)." 2
In 1966, wells drilled to a maximum depth of 2960 feet stopped
producing, suspending deliveries to United even though the gas

purchase contract remained in effect.'1 3 The McCombs Group
succeeded to Quin's interest in Butler B, unitized it with the Butler
20% shares. Id. Cox's explanation might have been plausible to the Commission if proceeds from the 80% sale had been distributed only to owners of the 80% shares.
107. Id. at 450-51. Dedication of natural gas to interstate commerce occurs as soon as
deliveries commence-with or without Commission certification. Therefore, an illegal
abandonment can occur without a certificate being in effect. See J.M. Huber Corp. v. FPC,
236 F.2d 550, 557 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 971 (1957) (noted in Note, supra
note 25, at 688). Thus, Cox violated the Act twice: first, when it sold 100% of current
production to Texas Gas, which should only have received 80% under the certificate; and
second, when it diverted the 20% to intrastate commerce.
108. 581 F.2d at 451.
109. Id.
110. 705 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated and withdrawn on othergrounds, appeal
dismissedper stipulation, 710 F.2d 611 (10th Cir. 1983). The withdrawal of the opinion by
the Tenth Circuit was a condition imposed by FERC on the settlement of the case. Letter
from Stanley L. Cunningham, counsel for petitioners, McCombs Group to the author
(Nov. 21, 1983) (on fe with the Case Western Reserve Law Review).
11. In an earlier decision resolving the same controversy, United Gas Pipe Line Company v. McCombs, 442 U.S. 529 (1979), the Supreme Court held that McCombs had violated the Act by diverting gas committed to a certificated interstate contract without the
Commission's express approval for abandonment. Id. at 531.
112. McCombs, 705 F.2d at 1179. The Commission certificated the contract in 1954.
In 1963 it issued new certificates requiring Quin's successors in interest to continue service.
Id.
113. United Gas, 442 U.S. at 532. McCombs' predecessor in interest notified United of
the depletion of existing wells but never sought the Commission's permission to abandon
service to United. Id. at 532-33; see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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A tract, 1 4 and drilled wells to 8700 to 9700 feet. The group discovered new reserves which it contracted to sell to E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Company (du Pont) in intrastate commerce. 1 5 When
United discovered that the gas delivered to du Pont was the same
as the reserves committed to it under the 1953 certificate, it filed a
6
complaint with the Commission."1

In this proceeding, FERC ruled that McCombs had violated

the Act by illegally abandoning the interstate sales contract with
United and selling to du Pont.1 7 As a result, it ordered McCombs
to pay back to United the volume of gas wrongfully delivered to
du Pont." 8 The Tenth Circuit agreed with McCombs' contention
that FERC lacked authority under the Act to order such refunds
in this context." 9 Endorsing the narrow interpretation of section
16 in New England Power, 2 0 the McCombs court stated: "[Sec-

tion] 16 allows the Commission to carry out [only those] specific
functions which Congress assigned to it in the Act .... 121
In similar fact settings, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits reached

opposite conclusions on FERC's authority to order in kind refunds. In both cases, the Commission ordered refunds to remedy
114. McCombs, 705 F.2d at 1179.
115. United Gas, 442 U.S. at 533.
116. McCombs, 705 F.2d at 1179.
117. Id. Since McCombs had unitized the Butler tracts, the Commission determined
that some of the gas produced on A was attributable to B's reserves and therefore had been
dedicated to interstate commerce under the 1963 certificate. Id. "Unitized" gas refers to
two or more tracts overlaying a common field of gas operated as a single production unit.
Id. at n.1.
McCombs claimed to have dissolved its unitized operation of A and B, and asserted
that the dissolution was retroactive in effect. Id. at 1180. The court postponed consideration of this issue, but stated that if it later found the two tracts to have been de-unitized, the
volume of refunds ordered would be proportionally reduced. Id.
In United Gas, McCombs argued that its sale of certificated interstate gas to a new
customer did not violate the Act since the old contract was legally abandoned when Quin's
shallower wells ceased producing. McCombs based its argument on the fact that the 1954
and 1963 certificates did not include well depth specifications. 442 U.S. at 534, 541-42.
The Commission ruled that the group violated the Act because the certificates encompassed reserves under the property at all depths and neither McCombs nor its predecessor,
Quin, had obtained prior approval for the abandonment. Id. at 534. While the Tenth
Circuit did not disagree with the Commission's finding that the certificates included gas at
any depth, it held that § 7(b) approval for the abandonment was unnecessary in this case.
Mc Combs, 570 F.2d at 1381-82. The Supreme Court agreed with the Commission's interpretation of the certificates' scope and reversed, holding that express prior abandonment
approval was required in this case. United Gas, 442 U.S. at 534.
118. McCombs, 705 F.2d at 1180.
119. Id. at 1184-85.
120. 467 F.2d 425, 430-31 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aft'd, 415 U.S. 345 (1974); see supra text
accompanying notes 54-55.
121. McCombs, 705 F.2d at 1184.
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unwillful and unknowing abandonments of interstate service. 122
In Cox, the producer believed that it could produce gas out of
balance and later sell the uncommitted share under a different
contract. It was unaware that selling the uncommitted share constituted abandoned service for which Commission approval was
required.'23 Likewise, the petitioner in McCombs did not realize
it had abandoned service by selling gas discovered through deeper
drilling. McCombs believed that the certificate for sales to United
had pertained only to gas found at shallower depths and thus had
been effectively abandoned by Quin. 2 4 Since neither Cox nor
McCombs intended to commit a violation, the two circuits should
have reached the same conclusion.
The Tenth Circuit's analysis of section 16 authority is more
comprehensive and persuasive than the Fifth's. The Cox court
neglected to examine the different interpretations of the statute,
and failed to make a detailed application of the necessary or appropriate test. Instead, the Fifth Circuit simply noted the approval of cash refunds in other contexts and concluded that the
remedy is equitable and reasonable and prevents unjust enrichment. 25 The Tenth Circuit provided a more sophisticated analysis of the validity of the section 16 order. The McCombs court
examined and distinguished cases where refunds were
126
approved.
The court did not explain, however, why in kind refunds failed
to meet the necessary or appropriate test under its facts. Nevertheless, the superficiality of Cox undercuts its precedential value
as a mandate for the validity of in kind refunds.
3.

Comparison of In Kind Refunds in the Abandonment and
Curtailment Contexts

The Tenth Circuit in McCombs compared the use of in kind
refunds in abandonment and curtailment situations. 27 The court
noted that actual refunds never occur in curtailment cases since
122. The federal courts have not inquired into culpability when considering remedies
for violations of the Act. Nevertheless, culpability is an important factor to consider because it is specifically mentioned in § 7 of the Act: "Any person who willfully and knowingly does... any act. . . in this chapter prohibited or declared to be unlawful... shall
be punished by a fine... or by imprisonment... or both." 15 U.S.C. § 717t (1976).
123. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
125. Cox, 581 F.2d at 451.
126. McCombs, 705 F.2d at 1184-85.
127. Id. at 1184 n.5.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:458

paybacks are implemented by reducing the customer's future allocation under the curtailment plan. 128
The Tenth Circuit's comparison of the two situations was only
a cursory examination'of existing differences. The court failed to
mention, for example, that the culpability' 2 9 of violators in the
curtailment context greatly exceeds that in the abandonment
cases. The petitioners in UnitedStates Steel and Texas Gulf knew
their allotment under the curtailment plan but nevertheless took
delivery of a larger quantity of gas.' 3 0 In Cox, the violator did not
recognize the wrongfulness of using 100% of its production to satisfy an interstate contract for 80% of reserves.' 3 ' Likewise in McCombs, there was disagreement on the scope of the interstate
certificate and the existence of a legal abandonment. McCombs
believed that the certificate did not cover its newly discovered gas
and that its32 predecessor in interest had legally abandoned the
certificate. 1
Another difference between the two situations is the element of
emergency in the institution of curtailment plans. In the face of a
severe natural gas shortage, the Commission established curtailment plans 33 to protect high priority users from termination and
prevent any consequent harm to the nation's economy and citizens. The same degree of emergency does not exist in the abandonment context; the injured customers in Cox and McCombs did
not depend on the production and received a windfall when the
Commission ordered refunds. 134 Since violations in the curtailment context pose a more significant threat to the public, they
warrant a more serious sanction.
The import of these differences directly relates to the necessary
or appropriate test under section 16. To determine whether a refund or some lesser sanction is the proper remedy, culpability of
the wrongdoer must be examined.' 35 In addition, the propriety of
a remedy can be determined by inquiring whether it is necessary
128. Id.
129. See supra note 122.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 94-102
131. Cox, 581 F.2d at 450.
132. McCombs, 705 F.2d at 1179-80.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
134. In Cox, the Commission ordered the producer to deliver 100% of the field's production to Texas Gas, who had contracted to purchase only 80% of production. 581 F.2d at
450-51. In McCombs, United had been notified by McCombs' predecessor that the gas
supply was exhausted. Thus, United was not expecting the new supply ordered by the
Commission. 705 F.2d at 1181.
135. See supra note 122.
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to prevent total breakdown of the regulatory system. 13 6 The remedy should relate to the scope and severity of the harm caused by
the violation. Thus, the in kind refunds in Cox and McCombs
were inappropriate because the producers were unaware of their
wrongdoing. Moreover, the in kind refunds were unnecessary because enforcement of the Act and resolution of any emergency
37
could have been achieved through less drastic remedies.'
C. Monetary Versus In Kind Refunds
In the abandonment context, the economics of in kind and
monetary refunds differ profoundly. In cases upholding refunds-both cash and in kind-the abandonments were not willful.1 38 But in kind refunds impose a greater economic burden
upon producers than do cash refunds.' 39 Since the producer cannot retract the gas wrongfully sold to new customers, it must
somehow procure additional supplies-often by purchasing gas
on the open market. This is a particularly onerous sanction where
gas prices have increased substantially since the illegal sales. If
producers do not violate the Act intentionally, it is inequitable to
order cash refunds from one producer, as in G4f Oil, while requiring in kind refunds from another, as in Cox.
While the Commission has employed monetary and in kind
refunds in a variety of contexts, the propriety of these remedies
should be determined by careful attention to the factual circumstances and regulatory goals peculiar to each context-not by
vague analogies. Cash refunds in the excessive rate context, for
example, depend on authority not available in the abandonment
context.' 40 Moreover, they are ordered for an entirely different
purpose. In excessive rate cases, the Commission orders cash refunds to returnprofits earned by a producer from charging excessive prices. In abandonment cases, cash refunds are imposed to
compensate the customer for lost volumes of gas, and to deter fu136. In Texas Guf, for example, in kind refunds were the only means of ensuring compliance with curtailment plans. See supra text accompanying note 99.
137. See infra text accompanying notes 168-71 & 176.
138. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text. In GulfOil, the producer did not
willfully abandon service; it mistakenly overestimated its reserves. 563 F.2d at 593.
139. In Mesa, 441 F.2d at 188, a cash refund case, the court noted that the producer
"never established that it would be in a worse economic position after paying the refunds-a relevant consideration, since after the abandonment [the producer] possessed
quantities of gas available for sale elsewhere and from all indications, at a higher rate."
140. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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ture abandonments.14 1 Because of these differences in purpose,
cash refunds in the excessive rate context do not justify cash refunds in the abandonment context. And since cash refunds are a
less onerous burden than in kind refunds, 142 they neither support
in kind refunds nor serve as a reasonable alternative. Finally, in
kind refunds for curtailments, because they address a more signifi43
cant public threat, do not support refunds for abandonments.
IV.

SECTION

16 AUTHORITY FOR OTHER COMMISSION
ACTIONS

The Commission has utilized section 16 authority not only to
order refunds but also to perform a variety of discretionary actions. While the federal courts generally uphold its authority,
some Commission actions have been prohibited for exceeding the
scope of section 16. To determine the validity of in kind refund
orders, cases involving similar exercises of Commission authority
must be examined.
In Public Service Commission of New York v. FPC,1" the appellant contended that the FPC lacked authority to issue temporary certificates of public convenience and necessity to
independent producers in cases of drainage, threatened loss of
lease, flaring, or economic hardship from payment of shut-in royalties.' 45 Since the FPC could no longer refuse to exercise jurisdiction over independent producers,1 46 the D.C. Circuit reasoned
that the Commission had appropriately readjusted its administrative process in developing a procedure for independent producer
47
certificates. 1
In light of these considerations, the court interpreted section 16
in the following manner:
While the Natural Gas Act is a statute and is not to be construed as a "constitution," nevertheless the problems placed
under Commission administration, with consequent Commission responsibilities, call upon the courts to give the Act a scope
reasonably necessary to permit the agency to perform its tasks
consistently with the provisions and purposes of the legislation.
The broad grant of implementing authority conferred by Sec141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 133-34.
327 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
Id. at 895.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
327 F.2d at 896.
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tion 16 is not confined to procedural regulations, [but] demonstrates a realization by Congress that the Commission would be
confronted with unforeseen problems of administration in regulating this huge industry4 8and should have a basis for coping
with such confrontation.1
The Supreme Court embraced a similar view of Commission
authority in PermianBasin Area Rate Cases.149 After its jurisdiction was expanded to include independent producers, 50 the Commission continued to inquire into individual production costs in
determining whether a producer's prices were just and reasonable. 5 ' When this technique proved unduly laborious,' 5 2 the
Commission announced it would institute proceedings to determine maximum producer rates for each of the country's major
producing areas. 153 Pursuant to this policy, the FPC devised two
area maximum prices for all natural gas produced in the Permian
54
Basin.
The Supreme Court held that the Commission possessed authority to institute a system of area rate regulation. 55 Although
the Court did not specifically base the authority for this action
upon section 16, its interpretation of the Commission's general
powers illustrates how section 16 should be interpreted: "The
Commission has asserted, and the history of producer regulation
has confirmed, that the ultimate achievement of the Commission's
regulatory purposes may easily depend upon the contrivance of
more expeditious administrative methods. . . . '[C]onsiderations
of feasibility and practicality are certainly germane' to the issues
before us."' 5 6
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC,5 7 the D.C. Circuit found that the
Commission's contemplated action fell beyond the scope of section 16 authority. Through informal rulemaking procedures, the
FPC had established nationwide rates for the transportation of
148. Id. at 896-97.
149. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
150. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
151. 390 U.S. at 756.
152. The Court noted that "the Commission's regulation of the producers' sales became
increasingly laborious, until, in 1960, it was described as the 'outstanding example in the
federal government of the breakdown of the administrative process.'" Id. at 758.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 759-60.
155. Id. at 768-90.
156. Id. at 777 (quoting Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 517 (1944)).
157. 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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liquid and liquifiable hydrocarbons. 58 Mobil argued that the
Commission's ratemaking was defective since both the Act and
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) require rates to be
promulgated through formal rulemaking procedures. 59 The FPC
contended that its section 16 authority allowed it to follow the informal rulemaking requirements of the APA-public notice and
the opportunity to comment. 60 It asserted that, in light of the
informal proceedburden imposed by more elaborate procedures,
' 61
ings were "necessary and appropriate."'
The D.C. Circuit held that section 16 does not provide authority for employing informal procedures in setting rates.162 The
court elaborated:
The substantive provisions of the Act contemplate certain procedures, as incident to the functions provided. The range of
permissible procedures must be derived from these sections
...and the functions they describe. Section 16 . . .cannot
enlarge the choice of permissible procedures beyond those that
may fairly be implied from
the substantive sections and the
63
functions there defined.'
The holdings in Mobil, Permian Basin, and Public Service
Commission all rely on the same underlying notion of necessity
that is central to an analysis of authority for in kind abandonment
refunds. In Public Service Commission, it was absolutely necessary for the FPC to establish new criteria for temporary certificates to effectively regulate independent producers. 4 In Permian
Basin, potential collapse of the regulatory system made it equally
crucial for the Commission to establish area rate ceilings. 165 In
Mobil, however, the FPC invoked section 16 to engage in informal rulemaking, not because of necessity but merely to make
more convenient the performance of its statutory duties. 66 Indeed, informal rulemaking was inappropriate as well, since the
Act specifies procedures to be followed for establishing rates.
Use of in kind refunds to remedy illegal abandonments more
closely resembles the Mobil situation. The availability of other
remedies to compensate victims and deter future violators in the
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 1243-45.
Id. at 1246, 1249.
Id. at 1249.
Id. at 1255.
Id. at 1257.
Id.
See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 149-56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
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abandonment context 1 67 indicates that the degree of necessity involved in Public Service Commission and Permian Basin is not
present. Therefore, the latter two cases do not lend support to the
use of in kind refunds for illegal abandonments.
V.

ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THE COMMISSION

The availability of other means to enforce the Act's provisions
makes in kind refunds unnecessary in remedying illegal abandonments.16 8 Section 20(a) 169 allows the Commission to bring an ac-

tion for injunctive relief in federal district court when it believes
that a regulated party is violating or is about to violate the Act.'7 °
This

remedy

would

be

useful in

preventing

illegal

abandonments. 171
Substantial civil and criminal sanctions are available to the

Commission under section 21.172 The courts can impose criminal
penalties of up to $5000 and two years imprisonment, and civil
fines of up to $500 for each day the offense continues. 173 The statutory provisions for civil and criminal sanctions require that the

acts or omissions leading to the violation be willfully and knowingly committed. 74 Thus, unintentional violations like those in
Cox and McCombs may not be covered by these provisions. Even

so, the Commission can still seek injunctive relief under section

20. 175

Cash refunds like those ordered in Guf Oil are also adequate
167. See infra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
168. See generally Marston & Hollis, supra note 22, at 1106-25.
169. 15 U.S.C. § 717s(a) (1976).
170. Id. This section provides in pertinent part:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or about
to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of
the provisions of this chapter... it may in its discretion bring an action in the
proper district court of the United States ... to enjoin such acts or practices and
to enforce compliance with this chapter or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or decree
or restraining order shall be granted without bond.
171. In rejecting the use of in kind refunds, the McCombs court noted the availability
of this remedy. 705 F.2d at 1183. Nevertheless, the Commission has not often employed
this enforcement procedure, and commentators have noted several drawbacks to it: "(1)
the cumbersome and time-consuming factfinding procedures utilized in cases where violations of the law were suspected or apparent; (2) the lack of a realistic and viable deterrent
to violations; and (3) the inadequacy of the FPC institutional framework." Marston &
Hollis, supra note 22, at I 110-11.
172. 15 U.S.C. § 717t (1976).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
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to remedy illegal abandonments.176 This type of order forces the
violator to return its wrongful gain and makes the injured customer whole. Producers who calculate the risks and choose to
abandon, however, may not be deterred by monetary refunds.
While the threat of in kind refunds may provide greater deterrence than monetary refunds alone, the most effective weapon is a
combination of criminal and civil sanctions and cash refunds.
This combined remedy not only redresses the customer's injuries
but also deters future intentional violations by holding out the
prospect of fines and jail terms.
The availability of these remedies makes in kind paybacks unnecessary and inappropriate in all abandonment scenarios. For
knowing and willful violators, the prospect of criminal and civil
penalties together with cash refunds makes in kind restitution unnecessary. Moreover, in kind refunds will not deter violators with
access to reserves of uncommitted gas. Finally, if the violator has
not acted willfully, in kind refunds impose a burden out of proportion to culpability, while cash refunds suffice to redress the customer's loss.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Section 16 of the Natural Gas Act requires simply that Commission orders, regulations, and rules be "necessary or appropriate."' 77 Federal courts, however, have placed undue stress on
necessity; they should employ a necessary or appropriate standard
which adequately considers both consumer and producer interests. "7' 8 The decisions upholding cash refunds for abandonments
and excessive rates, and in kind refunds for curtailments, do not
justify in kind refunds in the abandonment context. 179 Moreover,
in kind refunds are not supported by cases upholding section 16
authority for other Commission actions since the requisite degree
of necessity does not exist in the abandonment context. 180 Finally,
in kind refunds for abandonments do not meet the necessary or
appropriate test because viable alternative remedies are available
to the Commission.' 8 ' Thus, the conflict between the Tenth and
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
See supra note 12.
See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71-102 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 144-67 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
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Fifth Circuits 8 2 should be resolved in favor of the Tenth Circuit's
position, so that in kind refunds for illegal abandonments are
deemed an invalid exercise of authority under section 16.
ROBERT

D. HORVATH, JR.

182. See supra notes 103-37 and accompanying text.

